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 Shakespeare’s Blush, or “the Animal” in 
 Othello 
 Steven  Swarbrick 
 Brown University ,  USA 
 This essay examines how the rhetoric of animalization in Shakespeare’s  Othello 
compels us to think early modern categories of race in connection with early 
modern discourses of “human” versus “animal.” Beginning with Shakespeare’s 
representation of Iago, I suggest that it is the potential for  sameness conditioned 
by Iago’s counterfactual statement (“Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago”) that 
is most signifi cant about his relation to Othello. From there I consider the overlap 
between the play’s representations of animality and black skin. Read in the context 
of Jacques Derrida’s refl ections on animals, I consider the deconstructive value of 
linking the play’s animalizing language to the affect of shame. With its focus on the 
blush, Shakespeare’s  Othello shows that the affect of shame cannot be countered 
with a simple return to the “human,” since it is precisely the category of the human 
that the play’s animal and racial bodies deconstruct. Read so, this essay examines 
not only the negative side of animalization, which mediates categories of “the 
other,” but also the positive potential of cross-species relations for interrogating 
race in Shakespeare’s play. 
 KEYWORDS  William Shakespeare ,  Jacques Derrida ,  deconstruction ,  animal studies , 
 race ,  affect ,  performance . 
 Following the animal, following the Moor 
 In the fi rst scene of Shakespeare’s  Othello , Iago attempts to persuade Roderigo of his 
loyalty, stating: “For, sir, / It is as sure as you are Roderigo, / Were I the Moor, I would 
not be Iago. / In following him, I follow but myself” (1.1.55–58). 1  This exercise in coun-
terfactual persuasion, expressing what has not in fact happened but might, or could, 
“would” that Iago “were” not himself but, instead, “the Moor,” is, ironically enough, 
the subjunctive guarantee that Shakespeare’s “honest Iago” gives to Roderigo as evidence 
of his contrivance against “the Moor” (5.2.156). Yet, despite Iago’s negative insistence 
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(“Were I … I would not”), we could consider the performative potential of “were” and 
“would” as expressions of a conditional, that is, a non-absolute mode of being rather 
than as statements of pure diff erence. Writing on the subject of potentiality, Giorgio 
Agamben defi nes its existence as “a potentiality that is not simply the potential to do this 
or that thing but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality” ( Potentialities 
179–80). In this sense, potentiality is neither the power to do, that is, to convert potential 
into actuality, nor is it the power to not-do, to refuse. For Agamben, “To be potential 
means: to be one’s own lack,  to be in relation to one’s own incapacity ” (182; emphasis 
in original). Agamben continues: 
 Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality  are capable of  their own impotentiality ; and 
only in this way do they become potential. They  can be because they are in relation to their 
own non-Being. In potentiality, sensation is in relation to anesthesia, knowledge to ignorance, 
vision to darkness. (182; emphasis in original) 
 In reference to Iago, we can say that his relation to Othello blends the capacity to be and 
to not be, potentiality and impotentiality, inasmuch as “being” for Iago is contingent 
upon the capacity to be other, “the other,” which is prescribed in the verb “to follow.” 
 At stake in this discussion of Iago’s potentiality is his relation to “the Moor,” a category 
of otherness fi gured throughout the play in terms of racial and animal characteristics. 
Building on Robert Altman’s recent book-length study of  Othello , I will argue that it 
is the potential for  sameness conditioned by Iago’s counterfactual statement (“Were I 
… I would not”) that is most signifi cant about Iago’s relation to the Moor. As Altman 
observes: “While that ‘would’ contains a volitional element that ostensibly refers to the 
power diff erential between master and follower …, it may also connote the desire … to 
enjoy Othello’s cultural condition — all that imaginatively accrues to his ‘Moorishness’” 
(289). A loss of alterity is, in Iago’s paradoxical turn of phrase, an ontological gain 
insofar as it allows Iago to enter into unexpected couplings with Othello. While “Were I 
the Moor” could be read as an expression of impotentiality — thus resolving the condi-
tionals “were” and “would” and their potential for chiasmus into an opposition or mode 
of subtraction: “I would  not be Iago” — it can also be read in light of the subsequent 
line, in which the conditional mood of “were” and “would” has everything to do with 
what it means “to follow” and, at the opposite semantic end of the infi nitive, “to come 
after.” This paper examines how Shakespeare’s play establishes the act of following as a 
key operation in “the desire … to enjoy Othello’s cultural condition.” Whereas Altman 
focuses on the ontological couplings between self and other, my reading centers on the 
cross-species couplings that mediate categories of otherness in Shakespeare’s play. 
 Indeed, if we consider closely the language of animality in Shakespeare’s play we must 
ask who, or what, is the referent of “him,” “the Moor.” By sniffi  ng out his/its various 
permutations, we fi nd that he/it is in fact multiple. For example, Iago describes Othello 
to Brabantio as “an old black ram / … tupping your white ewe” (1.1.88–89). Picturing 
Desdemona and Othello’s sexual coupling, he describes them as “making the beast with 
two backs” (1.1.116). To Brabantio again, Iago says, “you’ll have your daughter covered 
with a Barbary horse; you’ll have your nephews neigh to you; you’ll have coursers for 
cousins, and jennets for germans” (1.1.111–13). These images introduce animality as a 
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key optic through which the play visualizes and dehumanizes its black protagonist. My 
goal in retracing the play’s dehumanizing language is to consider how the rhetoric of 
animalization compels us to think early modern categories of race in connection with 
early modern discourses of “human” versus “animal.” Moreover, I hope to show that 
dehumanization cannot be countered with a simple return to the “human,” since it is 
precisely the category of the human that the play’s animal and racial bodies deconstruct. 
 To this eff ect, I will examine two aspects of Shakespeare’s play that resist any clear 
opposition between self/other, European/Moor, white/black, and human/animal. First, I 
consider the preponderance of animal imagery used to denigrate Othello to ask how the 
positing of an animal “other” fails to maintain a strict ontological boundary between the 
racialized categories of human versus nonhuman. And second, I consider how the aff ect 
of shame might help us move beyond, or rather sideways to, a theory of racial diff erence 
and toward something more like the conditional mode of sameness suggested by Iago’s 
“Were I the Moor.” 2  Strangely (given its source), it is the potentiality of “Were I the 
Moor” that begs us to ask not only what it means that skin color is so utterly fungible, 
reversible, and confused in Shakespeare’s play, but also what it means that the shame 
associated with black skin seems always to fold back on white skin as well, collapsing 
any absolute boundary between self and other. 
 Extending the analysis of racial diff erence — a frequent if highly contentious topic 
in Renaissance studies — to the diff erential structures between humans and animals, I 
show that there is critical value in following after “the animal” when we, like Iago, follow 
“the Moor.” 3  In his essays on animals, Jacques Derrida aligns the action of following or 
coming after with the obligation to respond, asking about the consequences of limiting 
the power of response to humans. In an interview, Derrida explains that “when it comes 
to the relation to ‘the Animal,’ [the] Cartesian legacy determines all of modernity. The 
Cartesian theory assumes, for animal language, a system of signs without response: 
 reactions but no  response … [distinguishing]  reaction from  response , with everything 
that depends on this distinction, which is almost limitless” (Derrida and Roudinesco, 
“Violence” 65; emphasis in original). Contrary to those who assume that animals are 
incapable of intelligent response, Derrida asks what it might mean to respond (and to 
assume all of the actions and privileges contained in the word “respond,” including: to 
promise, to pledge, to give an avowal, to give an account of, to answer, to present, to have 
a right, to take responsibility) to an animal, assuming therefore that one has already been 
responded to  in some way by an animal who is capable of more than just a reaction. For 
Derrida, one is always following in response to something, whether human or nonhuman. 
 How we respond matters in shaping the beings we become. 
 Following Derrida, I suggest that the crucial (temporal) relationship between being 
and following that he posits with regard to humans and animals ought to be considered 
in the context of recent studies on shame and race in the early modern period. 4  My 
particular focus, to which I attend presently, is the blush. Codifi ed in the early modern 
period as a quintessential human response — one which distinguished truth from falsity, 
virtue from debasement, and more important, human from animal — the blush was a 
response restricted to and thus constitutive of “the human,” understood as white, morally 
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transparent, and capable of response. 5  What complicates matters is the parallel bifurca-
tion of human/animal and white/black. Because black skin was deemed recalcitrant to 
the blush and thus often associated with shamelessness and hyper-sexuality, the picture 
of black skin that emerged in the early modern period was one frequently associated 
with fi gures of animality. Edward Topsell’s  The Historie of  Fovre-Footed Beastes (1607) 
makes this entanglement of shamelessness, lust, black skin, and animality explicit as 
he compares the physical and libidinal features of African primates (both real and fan-
tastic) to black people. Accompanying Topsell’s massive zoological descriptions are a 
series of engraved images, one of which depicts “The Satyre,” a mythical creature part 
human and part beast, which Topsell (on the authority of Pliny) claims to be both from 
Ethiopia and also part Moor (13) (Figure  1 ). The satyr in question is visualized for the 
reader with “human shape, … rough-hayre,” and erect penis fully visible — a sign of 
his (imagined) “lust to women” (12). 6  
 This early modern hybridization of black skin and animality yields a number of impli-
cations for my argument. To note that the logic of the blush also extended to depictions 
of blackness in the early modern period is, on the one hand, to resist the tendency among 
 Figure 1  “The Satyre.” From Edward Topsell’s  The Historie of  Fovre-Footed Beastes , 
London, 1607. Photograph courtesy of the John Hay Library, Brown University Library.
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early modern scholars to reduce racial categorization and its attendant violence to an 
anachronism of a much later historical period in which the logic of eugenics replaced the 
early modern logic of bloodlines. 7  How else are we to read the emphatic bestialization 
of Othello or these lines addressed to Aaron in  Titus Andronicus ?
 GOTH: What, canst thou say all this and never blush? 
 AARON: Ay, like a black dog, as the saying is. (5.1.121–22) 
 These lines express a racial logic in  nascendus , in which the threshold between human 
and animal is defi ned precisely by an inability to respond due to skin color. On the 
other hand, no one logic of racial diff erence operates in Shakespeare’s play — singular 
and monolithic. Racial diff erences are cross-hatched by the diff erential articulations of 
human and animal, and any attempt to articulate the logics of animality and race will 
have to attend to their shared porousness and ligamentary structure — what we might 
eff ectively think of as their common skin. 
 This last comment raises the broader purpose of this essay, which is to assess what 
kind of animal Shakespeare studies has become after the deconstruction of the general 
category “the animal” begun by Derrida. For the turn to animal studies in Renaissance 
scholarship and Shakespeare scholarship in particular has marked a dramatic shift — 
what we might diff erentiate explicitly from a departure 8  — in the ways that “we,” liter-
ary scholars, activists, species-companions, and humanists, read and write about “the 
animal” (that beastly singular nominal) as well as the so-called “human/animal divide.” 
Connecting early modern attitudes toward animals with emerging discourses on slavery 
and class, Bruce Boehrer posits the common exploitability of humans and animals in 
early modern colonial frameworks (99–132). Similarly, Erica Fudge highlights the force 
and importance of rhetorical eloquence in defi ning the “human” apart from the “ani-
mal” in legal and political contexts. Even more recently, Laurie Shannon notes the wide 
variety of cross-species identifi cations in Shakespeare’s  King Lear in order to suggest 
alternative historiographic ways of describing humankind “within a larger cross-species 
milieu” (“Poor, Bare, Forked” 169). 9  
 While these scholars have taken the “animal” as their direct concern, they have yet 
to consider the full implications of the “human/animal divide” for other fi gures of the 
nonhuman, including those racialized fi gures of animality that we see in Shakespeare’s 
 Othello . To echo Andreas Höfele, Shakespeare’s “dramatis personae are infused with 
a degree of animality that a later anthropology, which could be labelled ‘modern’ or, 
more specifi cally, Cartesian, would categorically eff ace. Such an anthropology,” Höfele 
remarks, “undergirds  even some readings that would overtly distance themselves from 
it , readings which reduce Shakespeare’s teeming multitude of animal references to a 
stable marker of moral, social, and ontological diff erence” (3, emphasis added). 10  While 
the racist and racializing discourse that we read in a play like Shakespeare’s shares deep 
roots and deep connections with the history of brutalization and domination of animals 
in the West, 11  such connections have seldom been made in ways that mesh categories 
of race together with those of “human” and “animal” as ecological interdependents. 12  
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 This essay attempts to provoke that meeting, not with the intention of reducing dif-
ference to commonality but with the intention of thickening the diff erences internal to 
each category. This mode of thickening is what Derrida calls, in view of and in respect 
for what gathers and grows at the limit between human and animal, “the proliferating, 
transforming, and nourishing limit of  limitrophy .” He explains: 
 Limitrophy is therefore my subject. Not just because it will concern what sprouts or grows at 
the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but also what  feeds the limit , generates it, 
raises it, and complicates it. Everything I’ll say will consist, certainly not in eff acing the limit, 
but in multiplying its fi gures, in complicating, thickening, delinearizing, folding, and dividing 
the line precisely by making it increase and multiply. (“The Animal” 29, emphasis in original) 
 For Derrida, there is no one divide between humanness and animality, no one slippage or 
threshold; rather, the limit or  limitroph between humans and animals is always fractured 
and more multiple than the notion of  a limit allows us to think. Derrida writes: 
 If I am unsatisfi ed with the notion of a border between two homogenous species … it is not 
in order to claim, stupidly, that there is no limit between “animals” and “man”; it is because 
I maintain that there is more than one limit, that there are many limits. There is not  one 
opposition between man and non-man; there are, between diff erent organizational structures 
of the living being, many fractures, heterogeneities, diff erential structures. (“Violence” 66; 
emphasis in original) 
 Othello provides a way of thinking through the “diff erential structures” that separate 
humans and nonhumans, including those racialized “nonhumans,” and it does so in 
conjunction with shame. 
 Whereas early modern studies of shame have largely focused on the ways shame dis-
tances self from other, 13  Derrida upholds shame as vertiginously relational. He describes 
shame as an irrepressible “refl ex” brought about by “the impropriety [ malséance ] that 
can come of fi nding oneself naked, one’s sex exposed, stark naked before a cat.” Derrida 
continues: “Ashamed of what and naked before whom? Why let oneself be overcome with 
shame? And why this shame that blushes for being ashamed?” (“The Animal” 4). By 
taking seriously the provocation of Derrida’s questions about shame and animality, this 
essay seeks to understand how “black” and “white,” “animal” and “human,” emerged 
as (non)discrete signifi ers in the early modern period and to situate their emergence in 
that vertiginous encounter that Derrida, following the gaze of “the animal,” calls in a 
word, shame. 
 Shame, or re-dressing the animal 
 In his long essay, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” Derrida narrates a scene in which 
he is looked at, naked, by his cat, and describes it as an experience of “impropriety”: 
“the single, incomparable and original experience of the impropriety that would come 
from appearing in truth naked” (4). Whence this impropriety and who is in truth naked? 
Derrida writes, “It is generally thought … that the property unique to animals, what in 
the last instance distinguishes them from man, is their being naked without knowing it” 
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(4–5). Without this knowledge animals could not be “in truth naked,” as Derrida says he 
is, standing before his cat, since everything that would pertain to the truth of nudity or 
the nudity of truth would derive from an understanding of a fault, a  lapsus , and therefore 
a need to cover over, in clothing or in discourse, this naked truth that the animal could 
not respond to, not knowing itself to be naked. The opposite is the case for humans. 
As Derrida writes, “Clothing would be proper to man, one of the ‘properties’ of man,” 
alongside “speech or reason, the  logos , history, laughing, mourning, burial, the gift. … 
[C]lothing derives from technics. We would therefore have to think shame and technicity 
together, as the same ‘subject’” (5). 
 In thinking through the relations between shame, technicity, nudity, and clothing, 
Derrida revises the idea of  techne that can be found, for example, in Martin Heidegger’s 
defi nition of the work of art. In Heidegger’s view,  techne distinguishes art from other 
types of work. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” he writes:  
 Techne , as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings in 
that it  brings forth present beings as such beings  out of concealedness and specifi cally  into 
the unconcealedness of their appearance;  techne never signifi es the action of making. (57; 
emphasis in original) 
 Heidegger turns to the  techne of art, especially poetry, because this mode of knowing 
that brings things forth into their appearance has been neglected by philosophy. Like the 
animal, “it is what philosophy has … had to deprive itself of” (Derrida, “The Animal” 
7). Rather than focus on what comes after the work — the “art” object — Heidegger 
focuses on what is originary in the work — what we might think of as its naked truth. 
Like Heidegger, Derrida wants to return to a time when knowing would be linked to 
unconcealedness — or to nudity — before the imposition of a metaphysics of good and 
evil. He begins his essay, “In the beginning, I would like to entrust myself to words that, 
were it possible, would be naked” (1). Derrida is trying, in short, to respond to this thing 
called “the animal” to which he himself is — to which we all are — linked. 
 Yet, when Derrida attempts to respond to a more originary sense of being-with-the-
animal, he is immediately compelled to make clear that “the cat I am talking about is a 
real cat, truly, believe me,  a little cat ” (6; emphasis in original). The reason he gives for his 
insistence is that, in the vast zoographic literature about the animal, there is no discourse, 
philosophical or otherwise, which accounts for the responsive look of an animal who 
stares, “just  to see ” (4). Derrida writes that “since so long ago, hence since all of time and 
for what remains of it to come we would therefore be in passage toward surrendering to 
the promise of that animal at unease with itself” (3). The emphasis here is on a “passage 
toward” — not on something completed or fi nal. The Latin etymology of “promise” is 
 pro-mittere , which, according to the  Oxford English Dictionary , means “to go forth, to 
send forth,” as in an envoy or a missive (OED s.v. “promise” n. etym.). The promising 
animal which Derrida describes is one who is in passage. Toward what is unknown. But 
it would seem that the unknown future of the promise, the endpoint of its passage, is a 
cause of unease for the animal that, as Derrida says, I am, or I am after. It is the same 
unease that we fi nd early on in the essay in Derrida’s encounter with a seeing cat. What 
SHAKESPEARE’S BLUSH   77
makes this encounter so dizzying is precisely his not knowing how to respond to a cat 
that looks and that regards him. At the bottom of this cat’s gaze is a provocation to 
respond. But the very understanding of how one responds — as oneself, as human — is 
called into question by the insistence of a look that troubles one’s own self-defi nition. 
At the heart of autobiography there would have to be an insistent rejection of this look 
— a rejection bordering on a refl ex, a reaction — which is performed each time through 
a knowledge coterminous with the knowledge of one’s nudity — one’s shame. In this 
way, Derrida writes, autobiography becomes, in the fi rst instance, an act of confession. 
 As a cryptic sign of our being-with-animals, shame is a response indistinguishable 
from a reaction. Derrida calls it a refl ex: “I have trouble repressing a refl ex of shame. … 
Ashamed of what and naked before whom? Why let oneself be overcome with shame? And 
why this shame that blushes for being ashamed?” (“The Animal” 4). Derrida is unable to 
control his sense of shame, a shame which hides for being ashamed, and which produces 
a response identical to a reaction: blushing. The habitual, automatic, and in that sense, 
artifi cial nature of shame blurs the distinction between reaction and response, which, 
according Derrida, defi nes the Cartesian opposition between humans and animals. It is 
no longer a question, then, of knowing whether or not an animal has shame (and hence, 
all of the properties belonging to shame: from nudity to self-consciousness, desire and 
the  logos ), but of knowing to what extent a blush diff ers from a reaction. Shakespeare’s 
 Othello foregrounds this diff ering/ diff érance at the heart of shame by putting under 
erasure the assumption that response is exclusive to humans. Indeed, if to have shame 
is to know oneself to be naked, then the animalization of Othello forces us to consider 
what it means to be “human” and to be denied one’s nudity. “[N]aked without knowing 
it, animals would not be, in truth, naked” (5). By denying Othello’s humanity due to an 
inability to blush, Shakespeare’s play not only repeats the species logic that divides animal 
from human but also undoes this very logic by showing white skin to be as reactive, and 
therefore as animalistic, as its so-called racial “others.” 
 White skin, black mask 
 Returning to this essay’s opening question, let us consider what it means, in Iago’s case, 
“to be” and to posit a “self” inasmuch as this “self” comes after “the Moor.” By shaming 
Othello, Iago sets “the Moor” apart as abject, as bestial. And yet, “in following … the 
Moor,” these same categories of self/other, white/black, and human/animal strangely 
and paradoxically meet. They do so not as discrete categories that would maintain their 
fi xity but as entities that feed and grow otherwise than they were before their meeting. 14  
This is not a matter of collapsing diff erences; it is about exploring the diff erences within 
the same, and the sameness within diff erences. 15  What, then, do we make of the overlap 
between Othello’s supposed inability to feel shame and to respond in a blush, and Iago’s 
compulsory need to hide, conceal, and re-dress his sense of shame? The question hinges 
on the decision regarding the cut between self and other. Who is Iago (becoming) “in fol-
lowing” after “the Moor”? Iago’s positive negation, “I am not what I am,” only serves to 
heighten the urgency of these questions, as does the performative potential of his speech:
78   STEVEN SWARBRICK 
 Others there are 
 Who, trimmed in forms and visages of duty, 
 Keep yet their hearts attending on themselves 
 And, throwing but shows of service on their lords, 
 Do well thrive by them, and when they have lined their coats, 
 Do themselves homage. These fellows have some soul, 
 And such a one do I profess myself. (1.1.49–55) 
 Although Iago here calls attention to the diff erences between himself and Othello (the 
latter, for example, is assumed too credulous to uncover Iago’s false “shows”), these lines 
also serve as evidence of what seems, ironically, and despite Iago’s assurances to Roderigo, 
to reanimate the performative potential of “were” in “Were I the Moor.” “Trimmed in 
forms and visages of duty,” and off ering “but shows of service,” Iago portrays himself 
in a manner that not only highlights the theatricality of the play’s performance but also 
calls on the conventions and connotations of blackface and black skin to mask himself 
in the “visages” and “forms” that Renaissance audiences would have associated with the 
Moor. As Virginia Mason Vaughan argues:
 The most obvious change [between  Othello and Shakespeare’s previous plays], one that has 
been noted by myriads of critics, is that the black character in Shakespeare’s  Othello is not 
the talking devil with a special relationship to the audience he was in the plays of the 1580s 
and 1590s. Iago, the white Venetian who feels betrayed by his general’s promotion of Cassio, 
takes this role. … In crafting Iago, Shakespeare takes the convention of the stage Moor/devil 
that he had exploited so successfully in  Titus Andronicus and turns it upside down. (95) 
 Vaughan underscores the play’s counterintuitive mixture of conventions, or indeed, of 
skins: the role of the Moor is played by a white Venetian whereas, according to the play’s 
title,  the Moor of  Venice , the role of the white Venetian is played by a black Moor. 
Vaughan’s argument suggests that in its conditional form, Iago’s musing, “Were I the 
Moor,” functions as a real potential for racial transformation not simply as a statement 
of binary diff erence. In this highly paradoxical sense, Iago  is black, even though he is 
not in blackface. Similarly, Othello  is white, both because of and despite the fact that 
he is in blackface. 
 The performative mixing of skin colors — black skin for white skin and, white skin 
for black — was of course nothing new to the Renaissance stage, much less to the staging 
of  Othello . Blackface was common practice in the Middle Ages, and until very recently 
stagings of  Othello routinely employed white actors in the lead role. As Vaughan reminds 
us, “nineteenth-century minstrel shows did not invent blackface impersonation. Nor did 
Shakespeare” (2). Rather, “the performance practice of ‘blacking up’ thrived in religious 
pageants of the middle ages as a simple way of discriminating evil from good” (2). Yet, 
with the shift to early modernity, “blackface had become more than a simple analogy — 
blackface equals damnation — and taken on multiple meanings, participating in several 
readily recognized codes at once” (2). According to Vaughan, these “codes” participated 
in various social, moral, and ideological systems which, “by the time Shakespeare wrote 
 Titus Andronicus ,” “functioned … to create expectations and attitudes about black peo-
ple” and to solidify those attitudes into a category of racial otherness (2). Blackface in 
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the English Renaissance went from being a generalizable attribution of evil — regardless 
of skin color — to a “code” (a binary code) written for whites about black “others.” 
Vaughan concludes her chapter on  Othello with the following: 
 If the play is performed as written, I am not sure Othello’s part should be portrayed by a black 
actor at all, and it should not be seen as the pinnacle of a black actor’s career, as it so often 
is. After all, as Dympna Callaghan insists, “Othello was a white man,” and Shakespeare’s 
tragedy is not about Africanness, but the white man’s  idea of Africanness. (105–6; emphasis 
in original) 
 For Vaughan, the Moor is precisely who is being tracked, hunted, followed, and, as it 
were, put on stage for a white audience. Yet it is the “idea” of the Moor that we encoun-
ter, not the Moor himself. In following the Moor, we, like Iago, turn him into a concept, 
into an object for the gaze. One of Vaughan’s key claims is that “whiteness” as a concept 
gets unifi ed through the positing of a “black,” racial other. This argument would not 
run counter to Iago’s assertion that “Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago,” in that this 
“self” is, in a Saussurean sense, dependent for its meaning on a relation of diff erence or 
opposition. But is this the only way to read Iago’s statement? 
 While I agree with Vaughan’s contention that in much Renaissance drama, the black 
Moor takes over some of the structural functions of the “other” left by certain religious 
identifi cations, I would point out that, in Shakespeare’s  Othello , some of the more com-
plex fi gurations of blackness do not simply juxtapose black characters to white characters 
but situate both in a larger fi eld of bodies that include, quite prominently, animals. 
 I have already established Iago’s mixing of racial and animal imagery with regard to 
Othello. The animal imagery in the text extends further still. In addition to comparing 
Othello to a black ram and a horse, Iago confi des to Rodrigo, “Ere I would say I would 
drown myself for the love of a guinea hen, I would change my humanity with a baboon” 
(1.3.314–16). And to Othello, he depicts Cassio and Desdemona “as prime as goats, as hot 
as monkeys, / As salt as wolves in pride, and fools as gross / As ignorance made drunk” 
(3.3.403–405). This proliferation of animal imagery does not issue from Iago alone, 
however. After being spurned and dismissed of his duties by Othello, Cassio laments: “O, 
I have / lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of / myself, and what remains 
is bestial” (2.3.262–64). Cassio queries deliriously, “Drunk? and speak parrot? and / 
squabble? Swagger? Swear? … O God, / … that we should with joy, / pleasance, revel, 
and applause transform ourselves into / beasts!” (2.3.279–80, 289–93). Othello then joins 
in this bestial refrain through the cuckold’s metamorphic imagery: “I had rather be a 
toad / And live upon the vapor of a dungeon / Than keep a corner in the thing I love / 
For others’ uses” (3.3.270–73). Othello repeats this negative gloss throughout the play, 
exclaiming at one point to Iago that “A hornèd man’s a monster and a beast” and later 
projecting this beastly condition onto Desdemona: “O devil, devil! / If that the earth 
could teem with woman’s tears, / Each drop she falls would prove a crocodile. / … Goats 
and monkeys!” (4.1.62, 238–40, 257). 
 The presence of animals in this passage reshapes the concerns about race that are most 
centrally articulated in  Othello . While the preponderance of the play’s beastly diatribes 
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center around the perceived transgression of Desdemona and Othello’s union, and so 
would seem to support the racial opposition between “white”and “black” by grounding 
it in yet another perceived opposition between man and beast, I will argue that the play’s 
animals off er no such touchstone of diff erence. Rather, the assertion of racial diff erence 
is precisely what comes undone when animals enter the scene. Tracing the language of 
animality used in  Othello to characterize black skin as reactive, unresponsive, and lack-
ing shame and by emphasizing the artifi ciality of shame, its essential Derridean  techne , 
we discover that the shamelessness associated with black skin is precisely what  does not 
resolve into an identity of racial “otherness.” Instead it animates the very artifi ce of the 
skin (all skins) in Shakespeare’s play. For example, Cassio fi rst describes Desdemona as 
one that “excels the quirks of blazoning pens, / And in th’ essential vesture of creation 
/ Does tire the ingener” (2.1.63–65). Evoking the amorous blazon’s red and white color 
scheme, Cassio foreshadows Othello’s libidinally charged displacement of Desdemona’s 
shame onto the red and white handkerchief, “Spotted with strawberries” (3.3.435). Not 
only does Desdemona exceed the artifi ciality of “blazoning pens,” but she too becomes 
artifi cial, as the displacement of her rosy cheeks onto the red and white handkerchief 
(a textile infi nitely reproducible: Emilia says she will “have the work ta’en out, / And 
give’t Iago” [3.3.296–97]) evidences, and as the sartorial play on “tire” (i.e.  attire ) further 
confi rms. 
 These essentially  parergonal fi gures linking artifi ce and color, textile and skin, cut 
across racial identities in  Othello , calling our attention to a series of cosmetic and sarto-
rial technologies commonly used on the early modern stage. 16  Shame cannot be separated 
from animality, nor animality from race, nor race from  techne . Rather, at precisely the 
moment these couplings of shame,  techne , animality, and race are deployed, they give 
rise to a queer assemblage of relations (we can call it a common skin) not resolvable into 
discrete identities. As we shall see, there is more to following these fi gures ( the animal, 
 the Moor) than appears at fi rst glance — or might we better say, fi rst blush. 
 Signifying the blush 
 After having accused Desdemona of being “false,” and after having received her incred-
ulous reply, “Alas, what ignorant sin have I committed?,” Othello responds:
 Was this fair paper, this most goodly book, 
 Made to write “whore” upon? What committed? 
 . . .
 I should make very forges of my cheeks 
 That would to cinders burn up modesty 
 Did I but speak thy deeds. (4.2.71–76) 
 These lines register at once the purity or transparency associated with “fair” skin as well 
as the irony of Othello’s realization that “fair” skin, like “fair paper,” is the most suit-
able means for announcing Desdemona’s shame. And yet, the fact that “whore” should 
appear, like a blush, so readily inscribed on Desdemona’s skin signifi es more than social 
stigma; it signifi es the early modern ideal that white skin should make transparent, and 
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thereby morally regulate, the deeds of its bearer. 17  The signifying protocols are altogether 
diff erent in the case of Othello. 
 While we are meant to read Othello’s “forges” as images of burning cheeks, we are 
also reminded of their forgery, of their artifi ce and fi ction. As Sujata Iyengar reminds us, 
“shame” in the early modern period denotes a relational context in which “social and 
sexual diff erence” plays a catalytic role (107). Persons of African descent, for example, 
“were thought to be unable to blush and therefore to experience shame” (107). Such a 
notion would later be overturned by Charles Darwin. 18  But within the signifying econ-
omy of the Renaissance, it was still the case that blushing raised acute anxieties about 
the representational opacity of particular identities (most often female and/or of color) 
and about the concomitant “hermeneutic breakdown” of moral codes pertaining to the 
legibility of shame within early modern society (Iyengar 103). Blushing was a key focus of 
these anxieties. As a symbol of either “innocence or guilt, prurience or purity, Englishness 
or strangeness,” the blush was a site of intense interest and vexation in the early modern 
period, especially when it aligned itself with forms of “dramatic illusion” (123). Because 
the blush could be hidden by either white or black cosmetics, “white” skin could also 
be deemed “blackened” if the blush were rendered invisible. Focusing on two types of 
dramatic illusion — make-up used to simulate a blush and make-up used to simulate 
black skin — Iyengar shows how the “tactics and purposes of theater” intersected with 
the moral semiotics of the face, creating “dubious” “connections between blushing,” 
“blackening,” and theatrical prosthetics (123). 
 Othello imagines such non-mimetic surfaces when he describes Desdemona’s face as 
“fair paper” and his own fl ushed cheeks as “forges.” He looks to Desdemona’s cheeks 
for evidence of her shame. What he fi nds, however, is a blush that can either be writ-
ten or unwritten upon the skin, without any necessary relation to its author. Here the 
propinquity of the blush to Desdemona’s shame mixes with the language of printing, 
copying, and the typography of “goodly book[s],” bringing to the fore the technology of 
the blush as well as its potential for revision. The performance of shame thus signifi es one 
of the many ways of inhabiting the all too sketchy lines of demarcation between shame/
performance and the no less sketchy lines of demarcation between white/black and self/
other. 19  It equally confounds the demarcation between reaction/response, with all that 
they entail for the division between humans and animals. We fi rst saw this performative 
potential in Iago’s assertion that “In following [the Moor], I follow but myself,” and 
later in Derrida’s analysis of the technicity of shame. These scenes lead us back to the 
dialogue with which this essay opened. 
 The language of animality used in Shakespeare’s  Othello to characterize black skin as 
unexpressive, unresponsive, lacking shame and, hence, reactive, programmed, and arti-
fi cial, is precisely what does not resolve into an identity of racial “otherness” but which 
cuts across racial identities in Shakespeare’s play. Rather than read Iago’s statement in 
the negative (“Were I ... I would not”), I would suggest that the performative nature of 
Iago’s presentation, his artifi cial pose, highlights the play’s central concern regarding not 
black skin per se or its supposed otherness, but the linkage between diff erent skins — their 
shared opacity, artifi ciality, constructedness and interdependence — which the language 
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of shame and animality makes visible (or not) in the blush. In following the Moor, Iago 
hints at the essential ambiguity between truth and artifi ce, which causes Derrida to 
look twice at the animal that, it is presumed, cannot respond for a lack of shame. The 
shamelessness that is similarly attributed to black skin due to its supposed inability to 
respond in a blush is also made ambiguous by Iago’s claim that, in following the Moor, 
“I follow but myself.” The distinctions between response and reaction, white skin and 
black skin, human and animal, dissolve in this act of following and in the conditional, 
that is to say, performative nature of the blush. Indeed, if true hearts avail themselves 
most readily through the appearance and disappearance of the blush, linking blushing 
to that cultural logic of shame that, as Gail Kern Paster has shown, lexically marked the 
internal and external movements of the body through signs of embarrassment, Iago, by 
contrast, keeps his “shows” of heart purposively skin-deep: “For when my outward action 
doth demonstrate / The native act and fi gure of my heart / In complement extern, ‘tis not 
long after / But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve / For daws to peck at” (1.1.61–65). 
The presence of animals in this passage, imagined as birds of prey, should remind us just 
how tenuous are the borders between animality and shame. Iago’s next line, I believe, 
makes this tenuousness axiomatic for Shakespeare’s play: “I am not what I am” (1.1.65). 
 By following the trajectory mapped out by Derrida, for whom “being” and “following” 
denote overlapping potentials of the “I am,” we discover strange manifolds of diff er-
ences-within-the-same and sameness-within-diff erence, which put being in relation to 
non-being, potentiality to impotentiality. Altman remarks, rightly, that Iago’s relation to 
Othello makes visible the “[l]igatures of [s]elf and [s]tranger,” whereby “[i]t is possible 
… that the self can harbor an unexpected stranger from a foreign land” (287). I would 
second Altman’s assertion and have tried to foreground the co-composition of race and 
animality according to that ligamentary structure. And yet beyond the familiar strangers 
that concern Altman’s study, strangers who, in the fi nal analysis, remain all-too-human, 
by showing that the stranger within Shakespeare’s play is also the radically inhuman 
stranger or  arrivant , 20  and that no account of racial diff erence in  Othello is complete 
without a consideration of this vertiginous animal supplement, however shameful. As 
Derrida remarks, the fi rst and decisive question regarding animals concerns their impo-
tentiality — that is, their ability to suff er. “The question is disturbed by a certain  passiv-
ity ,” Derrida writes, for “‘Can they suff er?’ amounts to asking ‘Can they  not be able ?’” 
(“The Animal” 27–28; emphasis in original). I have shown that the disabling force of shame 
and animality is inextricable from the categorization of race in Shakespeare’s play. Yet I 
also want to suggest that the injunction posed to Shakespeare scholarship following the 
deconstruction of the general category “the animal” is to see impotentiality not as the 
opposite of potential, but as the potential simply to not-be. What are the possibilities of 
not-being? In the case of Iago, not-being entails exposure to what Agamben calls “the 
open,” where human and animal, white and black, gather and meet ( The Open 57–62, 
68). In  Othello , they do not meet peaceably: in this tragedy, the Moor’s fi nal words, “I 
took by th’ throat the circumcisèd dog / And smote him — thus,” remind us all too well 
that the potential to suff er is also the potential to die (5.2.355–56). And yet, death here 
should not be seen as opposed to life. “To live,” Derrida writes, “is not something one 
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learns … it is not learned from life, taught by life. Only from the other and by death” 
( Specters xvii). Shakespeare studies should learn to welcome these others. And as to the 
animal that might be welcomed; yes, provided we know how to respond. 
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 Notes 
  1  All quotations are taken from  The Riverside 
Shakespeare , 2nd ed., ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. 
J. M. Tobin. Citations refer to line numbers of the 
play in question and appear parenthetically in the body 
of the essay. 
  2  For an overview of the recent interest in shame within 
literary studies and queer studies in particular, see 
Halperin and Traub 3–46. For specifi c queer workings 
on the aff ect of shame, see Sedgwick 35–65. Finally, for 
an exploration of shame that mantles racial diff erence, 
see Stockton. 
  3   See Loomba and Burton for a detailed account of 
the contentiousness of the category “race” in early 
modern studies (1–7). 
  4  For studies devoted to race in the early modern period, 
see especially Hall 1–24, 62–122; Bovilsky 1–65; Smith 
123–53; Bartels 1–20, 155–90; and Feerick 3–24. For 
studies devoted to the aff ect of shame in the early 
modern period, see Cluck 141–51; Fernie 41–108; 
Gundersheimer 34–56; and Paster 64–112. 
  5  See Iyengar 103–39 and Hall 62–122. 
  6  I have modernized the orthography from the 1607 
edition of Topsell’s book. 
  7  As Loomba and Burton forcefully assert, “most 
theorists and historians of race still tend to exclude 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from extended 
consideration. Often, they invoke premodern times 
only as a foil for later, more ‘racialized’ periods. 
Many early modernists concur, arguing that to 
speak of ‘race’ in the early modern period is to 
perpetuate an anachronism, because at that time ‘race’ 
connoted family, class, or lineage. …  But surely this 
complexity does not suggest that it is anachronistic 
to study race in the early modern period [emphasis 
added] . After all, ‘race’ is, even today, a confusing 
word that does not carry a precise set of meanings” 
(1–2). For a representative account that treats race as 
anachronistic to the logic of skin color in the early 
modern period, see Floyd-Wilson (23–86). The latter 
disjoins race from skin color in order to account for 
climatological or “geohumoral” explanations of race 
and ethnicity. In her words, “There is no question that 
black skin  becomes a scientifi c problem during this 
period. … But to attribute this conceptual shift either 
to bewilderment or empiricism is to underestimate 
the complexity … of geohumoral theories of 
complexion. We need to acknowledge that the racial 
stereotypes that facilitated the Atlantic slave trade 
were incompatible with geohumoral tenets” (5–6). 
While I fully acknowledge the complexity of early 
modern theories of complexion, I want to point out 
that it is precisely  how “black skin  becomes a scientifi c 
problem,” that is, how geohumoralism can transform 
into “the racial stereotypes that facilitated the Atlantic 
slave trade,” that Floyd-Wilson and many others who 
wish to guard against racial anachronism are unable 
to clarify. By addressing race and animality head-
on, I want to underline that racial stereotypes such 
as those that link black skin to animality were not 
only widely available in the early modern period, they 
also provided the missing link between early modern 
conceptions of race and the histories of transatlantic 
slavery that would later ensue. For a suggestive reading 
that fi nds the Atlantic slave trade foreshadowed in 
early modern discussions of “livestock,” see Shannon 
( The Accommodated Animal 270–83). 
  8  I say “shift” instead of “departure” for the same reason 
that Derrida says “ There is nothing outside of  the 
text ”: not because everything is therefore language, but 
because “text” conceived of as a system of diff erences is 
without fi xable boundaries (Derrida,  Of Grammatology 
158) . Hence, the issue is not that of going “beyond” 
humanism or of blurring the boundaries between human 
and nonhuman. This is the mistake commonly made in 
defi ning “posthumanism.” Rather, the “‘posthumanist’ 
point,” as Karen Barad has recently argued, is “to 
understand the materializing eff ects of particular 
ways of drawing boundaries between ‘humans’ and 
‘nonhumans’” (123–24). 
  9  I should note too, the rich effl  orescence of medieval 
scholarship on animals. See in particular Steel and 
Crane. 
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 10  Notably, even Höfele neglects to make as much as 
passing reference to race in his study of early modern 
animality, and this despite many otherwise fascinating 
discussions of the part animality played in negotiating 
human self-defi nition in relation to various “New 
World” Others. See in particular Höfele 115–70 for 
more on the negotiations of human–animal diff erence 
in colonial environments. 
 11  For an analysis of the linked histories between African 
subjects and animals in the West, see Mbembe. 
Mbembe is particularly sensitive to the ways these 
linkages surface in the history of Western philosophy, 
from Hegel to Bataille to our current state of 
“necropolitics.” 
 12  The is especially surprising given that two of the 
most far-reaching fi elds of critical inquiry to engage 
questions of the “human” and the “nonhuman” in 
recent decades have been critical race studies on the 
one hand, and animal studies on the other. In critical 
race studies, the displacement of the Western “subject” 
— defi ned here as white, able-bodied, autonomous, 
rationally endowed, and morally transparent — from 
the a priori position of legal, ethical, and political 
agent and cultural norm, has gone on in exact parallel 
to the displacement of the “human” by animal studies. 
See Wolfe 127. 
 13  For a highly infl uential example, see Elias. 
 14   Haraway uses the word “meeting” to connote this sense of 
becoming other. She writes, “To knot companion and species 
together in encounter, in regard and respect, is to enter the 
world of becoming with, where  who and what are is precisely 
at stake” (19; emphasis in original). Rather than separate 
humans and animals due to shame into two discrete and 
ontologically opposed categories (“the Human” and “the 
Animal”), Haraway insists that we treat species diff erences 
as “entanglements” of matter and the materializing practices 
of becoming “worldly.” “Species interdependence is the name 
of the worlding game on earth,” where “worlding” implies 
for Haraway tying and retying the many knots of multi-
species-being, “and that game must be one of response and 
respect” (19). 
 15  Here I point to the diffi  culty of thinking sameness 
and diff erence at once, a diffi  culty which Goldberg, 
writing on the legacy of Lucretius, argues is essential 
to the very task of thinking (in) the Renaissance. See 
Goldberg 1–6. 
 16  The  parergon , according to Derrida (following Kant), 
separates the inside from the outside, the intrinsic from 
the extrinsic, and yet also serves to connect them. In 
this way, the  parergon calls into question the boundary 
between nature (the body) and  techne (the frame). See 
Derrida ( The Truth in Painting ) 37–82 for a discussion 
of the  parergon in Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. And 
for a discussion closer to the concerns of the present 
essay, see in the same volume Derrida’s discussion of 
Kant’s troublesome horse 83–118. 
 17  As Hall argues, “Whiteness [in this period] is as much 
about a desire for a stable linguistic order as it is about 
physical beauty” (66). Illustrating the many obstacles 
to this desire, Iyengar shows how fl ush cheeks, when 
read as “the painted façade of modesty” rather 
than the clear signs of remorse, became rhetorically 
analogous to cosmetic surfaces — “tricks to deceive 
the eye” — which belied the blush’s moral and semiotic 
“authority” (124). Iyengar links the early modern stage 
to the ambiguities pertaining to skin color, such that 
“permanent complexion” mixes with “painted color,” 
just as real life mixes with art (139). 
 18  As Darwin writes, “The facts now given are suffi  cient to 
show that blushing, whether or not there is any change 
of colour, is common to most, probably to all, of the 
races of man” (295). See Darwin 286–318. 
 19  Sedgwick posits the intimate, relational dynamic between 
self and other as the defi ning aspect of shame. Far from 
being an obstacle to relationality, the emergence of shame 
depends on maintaining an already existing “interest” 
or “fascination” in the other (35–38). Similarly, Iyengar 
distinguishes between modern notions of shame, which 
presuppose an already internalized sense of self, and the 
relational dynamics of early modern shame, which entail 
a relational context wherein the self is exposed to others: 
“the early modern blush requires the physical presence of 
another to experience a sense of social shaming” (105–6). 
 20  Morton translates Derrida’s notion of  arrivant 
as “strange stranger,” a fi gure for the irreducible 
strangeness of beings who are strange not just for 
being “other” than human but, far more radically, 
for exposing the inhuman otherness intrinsic  within 
humanicity. See Morton 41. 
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